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RECENT LEGISLATION 
FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-RECENT KENTUCKY LEG-
ISLATION PERTAINING To ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINGENCIBS-A recent Ken-
tucky amendment to its perpetuities statute follows the lead of Illinois1 
in seeking a legislative solution to the problems inherent in applying 
the rule against perpetuities to administrative contingencies.2 The amend-
ment provides, inter alia, that the· vesting of any limitation of property 
"shall not be regarded as deferred for purposes of the rule against perpe-
tuities or regarded as a suspension of the power of alienation of title to 
property3 merely because the limitation is made to the estate of a person, 
12 28 u.s.c. (1952) §2680. . 
13 The interpretation of the "discretionary functions" exception as set down in Dale-
hite v. United States, note 7 supra, immunizes the government for negligence at a high 
"planning or cabinet" level, where policy decisions are made. If governmental activity 
at the operational level, where policy decisions are carried out, was also immunized by 
application of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction, there would be a very narrow 
spectrum of liability, e.g., "proprietary-operational" functions, and "non-discretionary" 
acts at the planning level. 
14 While this conclusion greatly extends the scope of recovery under the act, it can-
not be doubted that Congress intended such broad liability. The Court in the principal 
case, at 320, said: "Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are 
charged against the public treasury they ·are in effect spread among all those who con-
tribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden is rela-
tively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him 
destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this 
would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by 
Goverpment employees." See generally H. Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary 
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 11 (1942). 
l Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §153 (a). The provisions of the Illinois statute are the same 
as the Kentucky amendment with the exception of the reference to "suspension of aliena-
tion." See Yager, "Legislative Modification in Illinois of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 
CURRENT 'TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, 1953-1954, P· 197 (1954), for a discussion of the 
Illinois statute. 
2 This terminology was used by Professor Leach in describing some of the problems 
under the rule. See Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 HAR.v. L. REv. 638 at 644 
(1938). 
3 The Kentucky perpetuities statute refers to a suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation for a period longer than "lives in being at the creation of the estate, and 
twenty-one years and ten months thereafter." Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.220. The Ken-
tucky courts, however, have indicated that this statute is declaratory of the common law, 
and the common law rule against perpetuities is in effect. See 3 SIMES &: SMITII, FUTURE 
INTERF.STS, 2d ed., §1414 (1956). 
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or to a personal representative, or to a trustee under a will, or to take 
effect on the probate of a will." Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.220. 
Authorities have frequently recommended remedial legislation de-
signed to overcome specific problems and pitfalls with respect to the rule 
against perpetuities.4 The case of the "administrative contingency" is 
one such trap which harasses the unwary draftsman. This term refers 
to a gift contingent upon "probate of a will," "payment of a debt," "dis-
tribution of an estate," or a similar event occurring in the administration 
of an estate.I• The validity of an interest under the rule against perpe-
tuities requires absolute certainty of vesting within lives in being and 21 
years, and this determination is made as of the creation of the interest. 
Thus, a devise conditioned upon the probate of an estate or similar con-
tingency may be held invalid because of the mathematical possibility that 
this administrative event will not occur within the period required by 
the rule.6 At times the courts avoid this seemingly harsh result by con-
struction,7 or even by a presumption that the estate will be settled within 
a reasonable period.8 When the condition precedent construction cannot 
be avoided, however, the weight of authority holds that the administrative 
contingency renders the gift invalid under the rule.9 It has been pointed 
out that a provision for an administrative contingency does not contra-
vene the purposes of the rule, for such a condition causes no additional 
tying up of property.1° For this reason legislative reform has been con-
sidered necessary. 
The necessity for some type of reform became apparent when changes 
in the federal tax laws brought about the increased use of provisions in-
volving administrative contingencies. For example, in connection with 
the marital deduction in tax planning for estates, numerous writers have 
suggested the creation of an estate in trust with a life estate in the testator's 
widow and the remainder to be distributed to the widow's executor or 
administrator.11 A question may thereby arise as to whether a bequest 
to the administrator or executor, who conceivably may not be appointed 
4 See e.g. Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 
65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 at 747 (1952); Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. 
PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 731 (1955). 
5 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.23 (1952). 
6 Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); Miller v. Weston, 67 Col. 534, 
189 P. 610 (1920). 
7 Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W. (2d) 135 (1932); McQueen v. Branch Banking 
&: Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E. (2d) 831 (1952). 
s Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893). See 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT 
§374, comment f (1944). 
9 3 SIMES &: SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1228 (1956). 
10 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.23 (1952). 
11 See Casner, "Estate Planning-Marital Deduction Provisions of Trusts," 64 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 582 at 605 (1951); Mannheimer &: Wheeler, "Relative Merits of Two Kinds of 
Trusts that Qualify for the Marital Deduction," N.Y. UNIV. ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE 
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 673 (1953); Neuhoff, "Standard Clauses for Wills," 96 TRUSTS &: 
EsrATES 166 at 168 (1957). 
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within the required period, would be 'invalidated by the rule.12 In seek-
ing the maximum marital deduction, the testator may leave a trust to his 
wife consisting of property to be selected by his executor after payment 
of debts and expenses. If the payment of the debts is interpreted as a 
condition precedent to the vesting of the bequest, the rule may be violated.ls 
Several approaches have been suggested for corrective legislation. One 
method is the application of a "wait and see" doctrine to all types of con-
tingencies.14 Under this doctrine we wait and see whether the contingent 
interest does in fact vest with the period of the rule.1 5 This doctrine has 
. been adopted in Pennsylvania,16 and in a modified version in Massachusetts, 
Maine, and Connecticut, where the validity of an interest is determined 
as of the termination of certain life estates or lives in being.17 The second 
approach requires the framing of legislation designed to correct specific 
problems arising under the rule without interpreting the contingency 
on the basis of actual events.1s 
In response to estate tax drafting problems mentioned above, the Com-
mittee on Probate Courts of the Section of Real Property, Probate and 
Trust Law of the American Bar Association recommended the statutory 
provision enacted in this Kentucky amendment.19 It should be noted that 
the committee did not suggest modification in the form of the "wait 
and see" doctrine. The committee's approach appears to be more de-
sirable than that of the Massachusetts version of the "wait and see" 
doctrine, for that statute would not prevent the possible invalidity of 
a bequest to a widow for life with remainder to her executor or adminis-
trator, since the determination of the validity of the remainder would 
only be deferred until the widow's death. Hence, in this respect the 
Kentucky statute is considerably more useful to the estate planner. 
An analysis of the language of the amendment does indicate certain 
12 See Casner, "Estate Planning-Marital Deductive Provisions of Trusts," 64 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 582 at 606 (1951). 
13 See DeFosset, "Marital Deduction v. Rule Against Perpetuities," 29 TAXES 486 
(1951). In Braun v. Central Trust Co., 92 Ohio App. 110, 109 N.E. (2d) 476 (1952), the 
court held that a provision for the executor to select property to obtain the maximum 
marital deduction was not a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest. 
14 See generally Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of 
Terror," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 (1952). This doctrine is criticized in Simes, "Is the Rule 
Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 179 (1953). 
15 3 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1230 (1956). 
16 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.4. 
17 Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 184A, §1; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954; Supp. 1955) c. 160, §27; 
Conn. Gen: Stat. (1949; Supp. 1955) §2912d. See generally Leach, "Perpetuities Legisla-
tion, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 (1954). A judicial version of the "wait 
and see" doctrine appears to have been adopted in Merchants National Bank v. Curtis. 
98 N.H. 225, 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953). 
18 Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 735 (1955). 
19 The committee report is published in Edmonds, "Hints on Marital Deduction Prob-
lems," 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES 669 at 672 (1950). The committee pointed out that this 
statutory provision was recommended without "attempting to make a formal draft of the 
law on the subject." 
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shortcomings as an overall solution to the administrative contingency 
pitfall. The statute neglects to provide for the condition of "payment 
of debts." Further, its thrust is to assist the court in construing an in-
terest as vested rather than contingent when the limitation is to an estate, 
trustee, personal representative, or upon probate of a wm.20 It does not 
appear to deal with an administrative contingency expressly made a con-
dition precedent to the vesting of the interest. In such a case, the court 
could still hold the interest invalid because of the possible delay in vesting. 
A preferable provision should state that where conditions exist involving 
probate of wills, settlement of estates, or payment of debts, completion 
of such administration within a twenty-one year period will be presumed.21 
In these respects the Kentucky amendment appears to fall short as a 
remedy to the administrative contingency problem. Perhaps this short-
coming may be attributed to the framing of legislation primarily in re-
sponse to specific tax planning difficulties. Nevertheless, this statute is 
noteworthy for its objective of correcting specific problems under the rule 
against perpetuities without introducing the "wait and see" doctrine. 
Jules M. Perlberg, S.Ed. 
20 The word "merely" in the statute seems to require this construction. 
21 Cf. Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 707 at 735 (1955). 
See generally, SIMES, PUBUC PoUCY AND nm DEAD HAND (1956). 
